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Oil and Gas: Should the Cost of Transporting Oil Be
Deducted in the Computation of Gross Value for
Oklahoma's Gross Production Tax?
Producers of oil or gas in Oklahoma are required to pay a gross produc-
tion tax of 7% on the gross value of the commodity produced., They are
also required to pay an excise tax on the same products.2 Generally, the pur-
chaser pays the tax and deducts the amount from the corresponding payments
to the producer.3
These taxes have traditionally played an important role in Oklahoma's econ-
mony.4 In fiscal year 1987, over $372,882,960 in gross production and excise
taxes were collected.' This amounted to over 15% of the state's tax revenue. 6
This note will discuss elements of the definition of gross value for produc-
tion tax purposes. The starting point for the computation of gross value is
the posted field price for oil and the contract price for gas. 7 The posted field
price is the price major purchasers are willing to pay for oil of a specified
quality in that field.8
This note will address the problem that occurs when additional price reduc-
tions are made because there is no pipeline connection at the leasehold. In
1. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1001 (1981).
2. 68 OKIA. STAT. § 1101 (1981).
3. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1007 (1981). Usually, the producer owns a leasehold, and pays a 1/8
or 3/16 share of the proceeds to the owner of the mineral rights. The producer deducts the
corresponding share of the taxes from the royalty payment to the owner.
4. In 1908, Oklahoma became the second state to pass a production tax on oil and gas.
Collier, State Taxation of Oil and Gas, 11 INST. ON On. & GAs L. & TAX'N 397 (1959). The
current Gross Production Tax is derived from R.L. 1910, § 7464. This section levied a tax on
the gross receipts of the production. The tax was changed to one on the gross value of the pro-
duction and made in lieu of a property tax by Laws 1913, Ch. 240, Art. 2, subdiv. A, 1, p.
640. The producer was required to file a report showing the actual cash value at the time and
place of production by Laws 1916, Ch. 39, 1, p.103. This was modified by Laws 1933, Ch.
103, 5, p. 202, which required the producer report the actual cash value, to include any premiums,
at the time and place of production. This is essentially the version of the Gross Production Tax
in use today. At the time the principal cases that are discussed in this note arose, the Gross
Production Tax was codified at 68 OKIA. STAT. § 821 (1951) and 68 OlA. STAT. § 821 (1961).
The Gross Production Tax Code was renumbered in 1965 and now appears at 68 OKLA. STAT.
§§ 1001-1024 (1981).
5. Annual Report of the Oklahoma Tax Commission 2 (1987).
6. Id. at 22.
7. Oil is usually sold to a purchaser after it is pumped out of the ground and stored. The
oil is purchased one lot at a time. Gas has traditionally been sold to pipeline companies under
longterm contracts. This practice has been changing under the pressure of changing market condi-
tions. See Pearson & Dancy, Negotiating and Renegotiating the Gas Contract: Producers' Duties
to Third Parties, 56 OKtA. B.J. 2181, 2189 (1985).
8. 8 H. WILwIs & C. MEYERs, On. & GAS LAW 731 (1987).
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this case the price paid for the oil may be adjusted downward to reflect the
cost of trucking or hauling the oil to a pipeline, a receiving station or the
use of other companies' pipelines.9 The issue is whether the Oklahoma Tax
Commission (the "Commission") may ignore the adjustment for transporta-
tion in computing the gross value if the price paid for the oil was the result
of good faith, arm's length bargaining.
The Conflict Between Apache and Sun Oil.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has decided two cases that confront this
problem. The issue was first addressed in Atlantic Oil Refining Co. v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission.'0 The court held that the gross value of oil or
gas would be the posted field price with no deduction for transportation
charges."
A different conclusion was reached in Apache Gas Products Corp. v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission.'2 The court allowed a price adjustment for low
gas pressure, and held that the proper measure of the gross value of gas was
the actual sale price if it resulted from good faith, arm's length bargaining.II
The court stated that the Commission could use the posted field price only
if the circumstances showed a lack of good faith bargaining that indicated
a purpose to avoid taxes.'
Clearly, the decisions conflict. While the cases can be reconciled, the result
is an asymmetric judicial treatment of oil and gas producers within a statute
that treats them symmetrically in all relevent respects. Additionally, the under-
lying principals used in the two cases conflict, and objections that appeared
in the dissenting opinion in Atlantic later became the guiding principals of
Apache.
This conflict is of more than mere academic interest. In Sun Oil Explora-
tion and Production Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,I the producer at-
tempted to apply the gross production tax to the price it received for its oil.
This price was the posted field price less deductions made by the purchaser
as an adjustment for the costs of transporting the oil.
The Tax Commision, relying on Atlantic, assessed and confirmed an addi-
tional tax of over $500,000. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed in
an unpublished memorandum opinion, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
9. Alternatively, the producer may haul the oil to a pipeline himself. He may also hire an
independent hauler to do the job. Economically, the results are the same: the producer winds
up with less for the oil.
10. 360 P.2d 826 (Okla. 1961).
11. Id. at 832. There is no posted field price for gas. However the court's symmetric treat-
ment of oil and gas is easy to understand. See infra text accompanying notes 79-85.
12. 509 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1973). This case is, perhaps, better known for its impact on the
calculation of gas royalty payments. See, e.g., Harris, Gas Royalties- Leading State and Federal
Cases Reviewed: Alice's Adventures in Royalty Land, 37 OKiA. L. Rav. 699, 704 (1984).
13. Apache Gas Prod. Corp., 509 P.2d at 116.
14. Id.




denied the resulting request for a writ of certiorari. In the absence of a prece-
dent to resolve the problem, other litigation has begun .
6
Atlantic Refining Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission
Between November 1, 1956, and May 31, 1957, Atlantic produced oil in
certain counties of Oklahoma. The leaseholds in question had no pipeline
connections. The oil had to be trucked or hauled to the pipeline or receiving
station of the purchaser.
7
During this period producers of oil and gas were requried to pay a 5 %
tax on the gross value of the commodity produced.18 Atlantic computed the
gross production tax by deducting the cost of transportation from the posted
field price for the oil. The Commission computed the tax on the posted field
price without the transportation deduction and assessed an additional tax on
the difference.' 9
Atlantic paid the additional tax under protest and requested a hearing before
the Commission. The Commission affirmed the additional assessment. The
issue, as stated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, was whether the cost of
transporting oil was deductible when computing the gross production tax if
pipeline connections to the leasehold were unavailable.20
Section 821 of the Gross Production Tax Code (the "Code") required a
monthly report of the actual cash value paid for oil and gas at the time and
place of production, and a payment of a tax of 5% of the gross value of
the product.2 ' The Commission argued that the tax should be assessed on
the gross value which, it claimed, was the posted field price with no deduc-
tions for transportation.
22
Atlantic contended that the tax should be computed on the actual cash value
at the time and place of production or the gross value at the place of produc-
tion. Because production occurred at the wellhead, both of these quantities
were the actual amount received less the cost of transportation from the
wellhead to pipeline.
23
16. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, No. P-86-537 (Okla. Tax Comm'n 1988).
17. Atlantic Ref. Co., 360 P.2d at 828.
18. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 821 (1951).
19. 360 P.2d at 828.
20. Id. at 829.
21. 68 OYLA. STAT. § 821 (1951) provided, in pertinent part:
[Producers] of petroleum or other crude oil or other mineral oil, natural gas and/or
casinghead gas shall, monthly, file with the Oklahoma Tax Commission, a state-
ment ... showing.., the actual cash value thereof at the time and place of pro-
duction ... and shall at the same time pay ... a tax equal to five percentum
of the gross value of the production of petroleum or other crude or mineral oil
... which is hereby levied based on 42 U.S. gallons of 231 Cubic inches per gallon,
computed at a temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit for oil measurements and a
tax equal to five percentum of the gross value of production of natural gas and/or
casinghead gas.
22. 360 P.2d at 829.
23. Id. In this case, Atlantic apparently received the posted price for the oil but paid to
have the oil hauled to a pipeline or hauled the oil itself. In Sun Oil Exploration and Prod. Co.,
1989]
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The court agreed with Atlantic that oil was produced for gross production
tax purposes at the wellhead when it was brought to the surface and confined
for measurement. "4 However, the court disposed of the "actual cash value"
branch of Atlantic's argument by holding the words "cash value" only refer-
red to the reporting requirement of the statute. 2 1 The levying portion of the
statute referred to the gross value of the production, and the issue was reduc-
ed to the determination of the meaning of gross value. "
The court held that "gross value" was not defined by the statute.2 7 Atlan-
tic argued that the meaning could be derived from a 1957 amendment to the
Code.28 The amendment levied a production tax on uranium and defined gross
value as being the value of the ore immediately after mining or the value
that could or should have been received. 2 9 The court held that this addition
was not controlling because the legislation had the opportunity to similarly
amend the oil and gas provisions but did not."
The court then turned to the history of the oil industry to determine the
legislature's intent. The court found the price paid for oil had historically
been the posted field price, as modified for gravity, without regard to the
need to transport the oil to a pipeline or other station. In addition, the court
found the Commission had consistently construed gross value to refer to this
method of pricing ever since assuming its enforcement duties in 1931 .1
The court stated that a uniform and consistent construction of an ambiguous
statute by an administrative agency charged with its enforcement should be
given great weight and should not be overturned without a cogent reason.32
Additionally, the court held the legislature had acquiesced to this interpreta-
tion because it had met many times during this period of administrative con-
struction and had not objected."
Atlantic argued that one cogent reason for changing the Commission's prac-
tice was that this interpretation of the statute violated the constructional re-
quirement that taxes be uniform on the same class of subjects." The unifor-
mity requirement applies to property taxes, but not taxes such as licenses,
the producer tried to distinguish the cases by arguing the purchaser of Sun's oil took possession
at the wellhead. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. However, the value of the oil at the
well head is the same no matter who has possession.
24. 360 P.2d at 829.
25. Id. at 830. See supra note 21.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 848(5) (Supp. 1957).
29. 360 P.2d at 830.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 831.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 832.





privilege taxes and excises." The court stated that the gross production tax
was, without question, a property tax in lieu of an ad valorem tax.
36
The court held that nothing could be more uniform than the Commission's
practice of requiring all producers of the same gravity of oil pay the tax on
the same basis regardless of geographic location.3 Further, when interpreting
an ambiguous tax statute, the statute should be construed so it distributes
the burden of the tax uniformly.38 Therefore, the court affirmed the addi-
tional assessment and defined gross value "as the posted price for oil or gas
of like kind, character and quantity produced in the same field or area without
regard to transportation charges to pipelines."'9
The court based its interpretation of an ambiguous term in the Gross Pro-
duction Tax Code on long standing adminstrative practices. Because the court
found no good reason to change the practice, it construed the statute accor-
dingly. The dissent, however, argued there were two good reasons to change
the Commission's practice."'
First, the gross production tax is in lieu of all ad valorem taxes. 4 The statute
exempts production facilities from ad valorem taxes but not transportaion
facilities.12 Apparently, this indicates an intent by the legislature not to in-
clude transportation in the scheme of production for tax purposes. Therefore,
the increased value of oil due to the use of transportation equipment should
not be subject to the gross production tax.4
Second, the Code does not authorize the Commissioner to compute the
tax on the prevailing price in the field44 unless the sale price does not repre-
sent the actual cash value. 45 The majority, by equating gross value and posted
field price, makes this part of the statute irrelevant because the tax is com-
puted on the posted field price regardless of the sale price. The dissent stated
that a good faith arm's length bargain is the best measure of the gross value
of oil, and the majority holding allows the Commission to ignore this aspect
of the transaction entirely.46
35. See In re Skelton Lead & Zinc Co.'s Gross Prod. Tax for 1919, 81 Okla. 134, 137-38,
197 P. 495, 498-99 (1921); Johnston v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 497 P.2d 1295, 1297-98 (Okla.
1972). This point is not stated in the opinion and has created some confusion. See infra note 65.
36. 360 P.2d at 829.
37. Id. at 832.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 827.
40. Id. at 832 (Andrews, S.J., Davison, Haley and Jackson, J.J. in dissent).
41. 68 OKL-A. STAT. § 821 (1951).
42. Id.
43. Atlantic Ref. Co., 360 P.2d at 832.
44. "Prevailing price" and "field" are two among several terms that the legislature did not
define in the Code. The Commission interpreted prevailing price as the price that the majority
of the product sold for. If this definition is accepted, it is not the same as the posted field price
because the posted field price is a base price to which adjustments may apply. 8 H.R. WmnI~s
& C. ME Eas, O. & GAs LAw 731-33 (1987).
45. 68 Okla. Stat. § 833 (1951).
46. 360 P.2d at 832.
19891
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
The dissent's position in Atlantic was later adopted in the Apache decision.
Therefore, it is worth noting that the holding in Atlantic refers to both oil
and gas even though the facts only concern the production of oil. The sym-
metric treatment of oil and gas by the Code is the reason for this feature
of the holding.
4 7
This symmetry was still in existence when Apache was decided, and it con-
tinues today. 48 This observation should be kept in mind when analyzing the
effect of the court's treatment of gross value in Apache because the holding
results in different treatment of oil and gas producers.
Apache Gas Products Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission
Apache Gas Products Corporation and Warren Petroleum Corporation pur-
chased natural gas from R.H. Siegfried, Inc. and other producers in Lincoln
County, Oklahoma, over a period of several years. For several years prior
to April 1963, Apache and Warren reported and paid a gross production tax
on this gas. 9
The purchases were made pursuant to a long term, written contract. The
contract prescribed a price of 11C per mcf (thousand cubic feet) for gas whose
pressure was high enough to enter a high pressure line and 9¢ per mcf for
gas that had to be delivered into a low pressure system. The gross production
tax was paid on the value received for the gas."0
The Commission assessed an additional tax for the period August 1, 1960,
to Febuary 28, 1963. The Commission claimed 12€ per mcf was the prevail-
ing price in the field during the period in question and applied the tax to
this value. Apache and Warren paid under protest and filed suit for a return
of the additional assessment.
51
The trial court affirmed the additional assessment. The court found that
the contract was negotiated at arm's length. The court also found the price
represented the highest and best price obtainable for gas in that field under
the circumstances. However, the court held that the Commission was not bound
to use that price as the gross value but was authorized by law to use the prevail-
ing price in the field.5"
In addition, the court found that the Commission's price of 120 per mcf
was supported' by the evidence presented by the Commission. The evidence
consisted of data showing the price of gas purchased in January of each of
the years in question in Lincoln County. About 55% of the gas was sold
at 12€ per mcf, while only 2% was sold for 90 per mcf. Apache produced
47. See infra text accompanying notes 79-85.
48. Id.
49. Apache Gas Prod. Corp., 509 P.2d at 110.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 110-11.




evidence which demonstrated several other factors, including pressure, affected
the price of gas in a given field.3
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that the Commission's evidence did
not reflect the prevailing price paid for gas of like kind, quality or character
at the time the contracts for the gas were made. 4 Thus, the trial court adopted
the Commission's view that the contract price could be ignored and the tax
computed on the prevailing price in the field at the time of production.5
The Commission's practice had been to levy the gross production tax on
the actual sale price determined by the contract. The contracts were long term,
and the contract price might differ from the price being offered when the
gas was finally produced. When the price of gas went up, the Commission
wanted to collect the additional revenue.
Whatever the Commission's actual motive for changing this policy, the
language of the Code and the decision in Atlantic strengthened the new policy.
Section 833 of the Code permitted the Commission to levy the tax on the
prevailing price in the field at the time of production if the sale price did
not represent the prevailing price in the field 6. 5 However, the court's decision
in Atlantic appeared to make the Commission's power to tax on the prevail-
ing price in the field at the time of production absolute."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed. First, the court noted the Code
authorized the Commission to require the tax to be paid on the basis of the
prevailing price in the field only when the prices paid did not represent the
actual price." Because the unique nature of the gas industry required long-
term contract, the court held that the comparison must take place when the
contract is made, not when the gas is produced.9 The court stated that the
legislature could not have intended the purchaser to pay one price, deduct
the tax at that price and then pay the tax as if the gas were purchased at
another price.6"
Having ruled on the long term nature of the agreements, the court turned
to the pressure adjustment feature of the contract. The Commission argued,
possibly with Atlantic in mind, that the uniformity requirement of the
53. Id. at 112.
54. Id. at 113.
55. Id.
56. 68 OKIA. STAT. § 833 (1961), now 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(f) (1981), provided:
In case oil, gas, or casinghead gas is sold under circumstances where the sale price
does not represent the cash price thereof prevailing for oil, gas, or casinghead gas
of like kind, character or quality in the field from which such product is produced,
the Tax Commission may require the said tax to be paid upon the basis of the
prevailing price then being paid at the time of production thereof in said field for
oil, gas, or casinghead gas of like kind, quality and character.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
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Oklahoma Constituition mandated that the tax be computed on a price that
was the same for all producers in the field.6 The court gave two reasons
for rejecting this argument.
First, the Oklahoma Constitution provides that nothing within it shall be
constructed as prohibiting the classification of property for the purposes of
taxation.62 One valid basis of classification would be the variety of cir-
cumstances affecting the price. 63 In this case, the pressure could have served
as the basis for classification.
6 4
Second, the court traced the history of the gross production tax to deter-
mine its true nature. 6 5 The court found its prior characterization as a proper-
ty tax in lieu of an ad valorem tax was a judicial attempt to tax production
on restricted Indian lands without running afoul of the prohibition of taxing
a federal activity.66 Because this taxation had been allowed by federal statute,
the court overruled the cases that characterized the production tax as a pro-
perty tax.67 The court returned to the original view that the tax was on the
privilege to engage in an occupation and not subject to the uniformity re-
quirement of the Oklahoma Constitution."
Finally, the court noted that although the gross production tax was in lieu
of an ad valorem tax, exact conformity between the two taxes was not re-
quired.6 9 Therefore, although the ad valorem tax on property would be sub-
ject to the uniformity requirement, the gross production tax was not subject
to the requirement of uniformity.
Because no uniformity problem existed, and because great weight had to
be given to the Commission's previous practices of taxing on the basis of
market influenced contract prices, the court ordered the repayment of the
additional assessment. 70 Finally, the court directed the Commission to com-
pute the tax on the gross proceeds realized by the producer, unless the cir-
cumstances indicated the gross proceeds were the result of an attempt to avoid
the tax.7
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing OKILA. CONST. art. X, § 22).
63. 509 P.2d at 113.
64. Id. The costs of pressurization affect the value of gas. Collier, supra note 4, at 471-72.
65. The authorities have expressed some puzzlement over the importance of the Atlantic court's
characterization of the Gross Production Tax as a property tax in lieu of an ad valorem tax.
Collier, supra note 4, at 469-71. As previously mentioned, only property taxes are subjects to
the uniformity requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
66. 509 P.2d at 113-15. See supra note 35.
67. Id. at 115.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 116.
70. Id.
71. The court stated:
In future applications of the statute here involved, the Commission should apply
the gross production tax to the gross proceeds realized by each producer from his
individual sales contracts except where the conditions under which a particular con-




Conflict, Reconciliation and Problems
The holdings clearly conflict. Atlantic required that the Commission use
the posted field price for oil and gas to compute the gross value of oil and
gas for gross production tax purposes." Apache instructed the Commission
to compute the tax on the gross proceeds from the contract for gas and the
decision gave no guidance on computing the tax for oil.
73
In addition, Atlantic made section 1009(f) of the Code, which permitted
taxation on the prevailing price in the field, irrelevant because the posted field
price must be used to compute the tax independently of the sale price or the
amount of money that changed hands."4 On the other hand, Apache directed
the Commission to use the gross proceeds of the sale to compute the tax.
75
The section 1009(f) provision should only be used if the sale was made without
good faith, arm's length bargaining.",
The first question needing to be addressed is whether the cases can be recon-
ciled. The holding in Atlantic, as far as the taxation of gas was concerned,
was dicta because the facts of the case did not involve gas. 7 The holding
in Apache referred only to gas. 8 Therefore, any mention of gas in Atlantic
was not law, and the impact of Apache was to insure it would never become
law.
Therefore, the cases result in one rule for oil producers and another rule
for gas producers. The gross production tax is computed on the gross value
for either product. The gross value of oil is the posted field price. The gross
value of gas, however, is the actual sale or contract price, unless it appears
the bargain was not the result of good faith, arm's length bargaining. In this
instance the tax is computed on the prevailing price in the field at the time
the gas is produced.
Symmetry
As noted previously, the Atlantic court defined gross value as the posted
field price for oil and gas in spite of the fact that the gas industry does not
use a posted field price. 79 This was natural because it reflected the legislature's
not to be a reasonably prudent exercise of such bargaining, resulting in an im-
proper burden upon the public revenue by a price not representing "gross value
of the production of natural gas." Where the Commission finds such exceptions
to exist, it should make a proper adjustment of the tax to conform to the "prevailing
price in the field at the time of production."
Id. It is interesting to note that this definition of gross value is a return to the form of the
gross receipts tax of 1910. See supra note 4.
72. 360 P.2d at 827-28.
73. Apache Gas Prod. Corp., 509 P.2d at 116.
74. 360 P.2d at 832.
75. 509 P.2d at 116.
76. Id.
77. 360 P.2d at 827-28.
78. 509 P.2d at 116.
79. See supra note 11.
1989]
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symmetric treatment of oil and gas producers in the Code. The holding in-
sured that the legislative intent would be preserved upon judicial construction
of the statute.
With minor exceptions, the phrases "petroleum, or other crude oil or other
mineral oil, natural gas and/or casinghead gas" 80 and "oil or gas" appeared
uniformly throughout the Code. 8 The only deviations from this symmetric
usage resulted from the different physical characteristics of liquids and gases.
For example, in section 821 of the Code, the 5% tax on the gross value
of oil was levied in a different sentence than the same tax on gas. This was
done because volume and temperature standards for the measurement of oil
had to be specified. 82 Section 824 of the Code levied a 12 % tax on oil found
in natural depressions if the source of the oil is unknown. 3 No correspond-
ing provision for gas was created because gas does not collect on the surface
when it seeps from the earth.
Although the law has been amended many times since 1951, the essential
symmetry has never been changed. The current version of the gross produc-
tion tax, article 10, title 68 of the Oklahoma Statutes, shows the same pattern .
4
For example, section 1001(d) of the Code refers to oil produced by enhanced
recovery procedures, a method without counterpart in the gas industry."
Therefore, the legislature clearly intended to treat oil and gas producers
in the same manner. Furthermore, the rules derived from Atlantic and Apache
clearly do not preserve this intent because oil is valued by its worth to major
purchasers at their pipeline while gas is valued by the local market.
Although the legislature intended to treat oil and gas producers in the same
way, differences between the industries could require a statutory construction
that results in different treatment. Arguably, the Apache court supplied the
necessary distinction. The court stated that because the gas industry had a
unique nature, long term contracts were required." The oil industry did not
require long term contracts."
However, this distinction is not germane to the issue discussed in this note.
It is the use of the contract or sales price, as opposed to the posted field
price, to determine gross value that is of interest here. If the contract in Apache
had been for immediate purchase, the features of the Apache holding that
conflict with Atlantic remain. Gross value is the sales price, as legitimately
80. Casinghead gas is gas that is produced along with oil at an oil well. 8 H. WVn.LLIAs &
C. MECERS, On AND GAs LAW 120 (1987).
81. See supra notes 21 and 56.
82. See supra note 21.
83. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 824 (1951).
84. Sections 1001 and 1009(0 have replaced sections 821 and 833. There has been no substantial
change that is relevant to this argument. 68 OxLA. STAT. §§ 1001-1024 (Supp. 1988).
85. 68 Ou..A. STAT. § 1001(d) (Supp. 1988).
86. Apache Gas Prod. Corp., 509 P.2d at 113.




influenced by the pressure and other characteristics of the gas, unless the con-
tract is not made at arm's length and results in the payment of less tax."
Additionally, long term contracts are no longer essential to the gas industry.
Long term contracts were used to attract investors, who wanted guaranteed
sources of supply, to finance pipeline construction. The pipelines were for
both transportation and storage. 9
This need is no longer as great because gas can be stored in depleted fields
and due to the existence of pipelines. Therefore, when the price of gas drop-
ped two or three years ago, long term contracts were broken. The industry
began to use contracts lasting as little as a month to be able to adjust to
the changing market.90
In addition, there is now "open access" to the gas market. Producers can
sell directly to the user instead of to the pipeline. The pipeline company
becomes a transporter for a fee and plays a role similar to an independent
hauler of oil. 9 ' Therefore, if it could be argued that the need for long term
contracts is a relevent difference, that difference is disappearing.
The structure of the Code does not direct or imply different treatment of
oil and gas producers. Nor does the nature of the industries require they be
treated differently under the Code. Nonetheless, the decisions in Atlantic and
Apache result in different rules for each industry. To solve this problem, one
or both of the rules must be changed.
Construction and Internal Consistency
When the Atlantic court held the legislature had not defined gross value
in the statute, they immediatley looked outside the statute to the history of
the oil industry for a definition. 92 In taking this approach, the court chose
not to look at the entire Code to determine the meaning of the term. As
demonstrated below, this approach resulted in inconsistencies in the structure
of the Code.
One problem is that the Atlantic definition of gross value causes oil to be
valued at a point beyond the place of production. The place of production
is where the oil is brought to the surface and confined for measurement.93
88. Id. at 116.
89. Private Communication, Executive Director of the Oklahoma Independent Producer's
Association ("OIPA") (Nov. 2, 1988).
90. Id. It appears the days of the long term contracts are over because gas is now traded
on the New York Mercantile Exchange. This has resulted in a spot market for gas which tends
to keep the price fluid. See also Pearson & Dancy, supra note 7, at 2189.
91. Executive Director of the OIPA, supra note 89. It should also be noted that a similar
situation always existed in the gas industry anyway. Smaller pipelines, operated by "gatherers"
are used to collect the gas from wells in an area and transport it to a central receiving point
on the main pipeline. The purchaser, traditionally the major pipeline, pays the gatherer and
deducts the amount from the payment to the producer. Id. Because this is done by contract,
the tax is paid on the cash received by the producer. In contrast, although the hauler of oil
plays the same role as the gatherer, the tax does not take into account his services.
92. Atlantic Ref. Co., 360 P.2d at 830.
93. Id. at 829.
19891
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The posted field price for oil is the price purchasers are willing to pay for
oil delivered into a pipeline. For the producer with a pipeline, these two points
are the same and no problem is presented.
For the producer without a pipeline connection, these points are not the
same. Taxing this producer at the posted field price values the product beyond
the point of production. This result is inconsistent with case law. 94
The dissent in Atlantic also noted that section 833 of the Code allowed
the Commission to tax at the prevailing price in the field if the sale price
did not represent the actual cash price." The legislature intended to use the
market to define gross value as long as there was no collusion to avoid taxes. 96
The holding in Atlantic repealed section 833, at least for the oil industry,
and destroyed the intent of the legislature because gross value would be deter-
mined solely by the posted field price.
The dissent thought the better approach was to use the market to deter-
mine gross value.
A sale under circumstances indicating the absence of armslength
[sic] bargaining justifies the application of the prevailing field price.
But when a bona fide sale of the production has occurred, the sale
price should be accepted as the proper measure of value. The best
means of determining value is a bona fide sale.97
This statement correctly recognizes the interaction of sections 821 and 833
in expressing the legislature's intent to let the market determine gross value
unless there is evidence of collusion to avoid taxes. By using the four corners
of the Code to define gross value, the dissent avoided the resulting internal
problem of repealing section 833 for the oil industry. The dissent's construc-
tion of the statute was essentially the same that would be made in Apache
twelve years later.9
The dissent also stated that the tax was on production, not production and
transportation. 9 The legislature exempted production but not transportation
facilities from ad valorem taxes.100 Therefore, the use of transportation facilities
should not be used to increase the value of oil for gross production tax pur-
poses."'
94. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sun Oil Co., 489 P.2d 1078 (Okla. 1971).
95. 360 P.2d at 832.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 509 P.2d at 116.
99. 360 P.2d at 832.
100. Id. 68 OKIA. STAT. § 821 (1951) has not changed in this respect. 68 OKaA. STAT. ANN.
§ 1001(i) (Supp. 1987). Property not directly involved in production, such as pipelines, gathering
lines, compressors and collection tanks have always been subject to ad valorem taxation. See
Going v. Shaffer, 89 Okla. 46, 213 P. 736 (1923). Although trucks used to haul oil are not
subject to ad valorem taxation, it is not because of the gross production tax. Their exclusion
is based on licensing and registration fees as motor vehicles. 47 OK.LA. STAT. § 1103 (Supp. 1988).
101. 360 P.2d at 832.
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This argument can be based on legislative intent or the constitutional pro-
hibition against double taxation. The prohibition on double taxation makes
it unconstitutional to require a member of a class to contribute twice to a
tax burden when others in the same class are only required to contribute
once.'0 1 Producers with and without pipeline connections are placed in the
same class by the majority holding because the tax is applied to the same
price for both producers. Therefore, the Commission's practice of taxing the
transported oil at its value after transportation results in an unconstitutional
double taxation on oil producers without a pipeline connection. The transpor-
tation means are subject to the gross production tax and an ad valorem tax.
The constitutional support for this argument was removed by the Apache
decision holding that the gross production tax was not a property tax, but
a tax on the occupation of the production of oil and gas.' 3 Therefore, the
gross production tax is not subject to the uniformity requirement that gives
rise to the double taxation problem. The foundation of legislative intent,
however, still remained.
The legislature set up a system of taxation where the gross production tax
was in lieu of the ad valorem tax in the oil and gas production industry."'
The "in lieu of" provision makes it clear the legislature did not intend these
taxes to overlap. Taxing a producer who has no pipeline connection at the
posted field price puts a production tax on transportation facilities which are
already subject to an ad valorem tax. Therefore, the majority's holding is
inconsistent with the "in lieu of" portion of the Code.
Equity
Another concern is fairness to the oil producer without a pipeline connection.
In Apache, the court stated "[c]ertainly this portion of the Act does not con-
template that the purchaser shall pay the producer one price, deduct the tax
due the state at that price ... and then pay the State a tax at another price.) '2°0
The same logic applies to the fact pattern in Atlantic. A producer cannot
fairly be expected to be paid at one price and then be taxed on another when
other producers are not treated this way. The legislature probably did not
intend this strange result.
The Atlantic court stated that it was required to distribute the tax burden
uniformly when interpreting an ambiguous tax statute.1 6 While the court gave
no authority for this statement, its source appears to be a judicial attempt
102. See Olson v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 198 Okla. 607, 180 P.2d 622 (1947).
103. 509 P.2d at 115. It should be noted that the overruling of all cases in as much as they
held the gross production tax to be a property tax does not overrule the holding of Atlantic.
The need for uniformity is removed, but there is no reason why a uniform tax cannot be imposed.
104. 68 OrA. STAT. § 1001 (1971).
105. 509 P.2d at 113 (quoting W.R. Davis Inc. v. State, 142 Tex. 637, 180 S.W.2d 429, 432
0ex. 1944)).
106. 360 P.2d at 832.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
at equity and it is independent of the nature of the tax. ° The burden is not
laid uniformly by a court decision that requires the same tax be lieved on
producers whose products are not worth the same amount.
Out of State Authority
Oklahoma is not the only state to have a gross production tax on petroleum
products.' °8 While the laws of other states have no authority in Oklahoma,
they may be used to examine the logical bases and policy justification of
Oklahoma law. 09
The nature of the tax varies considerably from state to state."10 Most of
these taxes are of four forms. Some are taxes on the value of the real property
itself."' Others are ad valorem taxes on an interest in the product,"' and
some are property taxes on an interest in production." '3 Other states have
chosen to impose a tax on the privilege or occupation of producing, severing,
gathering or distributing oil and gas." 4
Oklahoma's gross production tax has been characterized as a tax upon the
privilege of producing oil and gas."' Several states have taxes that are similarly
characterized, and either explicitly or judicially deal with the instant issue.
Florida taxes those persons engaged in the business of producing oil or gas."16
The tax is computed on the value of the oil and gas as measured at the point
of production.' Transportation deductions are expressly allowed by the
statute.''
8
Texas levies an occupation tax on producers of oil and gas." 9 The tax is
computed on the market value of the product.2" The market value is the price
the product is actually sold for, less the costs of transportation and processing,
unless the contract was not made at arm's length or there is evidence of collu-
sion or fraud.'
Wyoming taxes the privilege of severing oil and gas from the ground. 2 2
107. See Magnolia Pipeline Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 196 Okla., 167 P.2d 884, 889 (1946).
108. See 4 W.L. Stmnaas, O. & GAS §. 781-815 (Supp. 1987).
109. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 365 (Supp. 1988).
110. The variety is amply displayed by the summary of taxes in the mountain states contained
in Kelly, State Mineral Taxation: An Overview, Mineral Tax'n Inst. 9-1 (Mar. 31, 1977).
111. 4 W.L. SumnsRs, OML AND GA § 374 (1962).
112. Id. § 785-96.
113. Id. § 797-98.
114. Id. § 801-14.
115. Apache Gas Prod. Corp., 509 P.2d at 115.
116. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 211.01-211.21 (Supp. 1987).
117. Id. § 211.02(1).
118. Id. § 211.03.
119. TEx. TAx CoDE ANN. §§ 201.001-201.404, 202.001-202.353 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
120. Id. §§ 201.101, 201.102, 202.053.
121. Bullock v. Mid American Oil & Gas Inc., 680 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Calvert, 451 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1970); W.R. Davis Inc. v. State, 142 Tex. 637,
180 S.W.2d 429 (1944).




The tax is levied on the value of the gross product123 which is defined as the
cash value of the product unless the transaction is not made at arm's length.
124
The courts have construed the statute to allow transportation deductions.'25
North Dakota's gross production tax126 has been characterized as a property
tax, 27 but is of interest because it is based on Oklahoma's gross production
tax.121 While the courts have not addressed the issue of transportation deduc-
tions the Commission has stated that the tax should be computed on the price
received at the pipeline less the cost of transportation.'
29
Generally, accounting for the need to transport the product before sale is
common no matter how a state characterizes its tax. 30 The limitation on the
state's power to set the value to situations where the sale indicates a purpose
to avoid taxes also appears in these states. 3 '
The scope of this note prohibits a state by state investigation of every tax
scheme. Nonetheless, it is possible to conclude that Oklahoma taxes the gas
production industry in much the same way as the majority of other states.
However, Oklahoma's treatment of the oil industry, especially when contrasted
with the way the gas industry is taxed in the state, puts Oklahoma in a minority,
if not unique, position.
Conclusion
The holdings of Atlantic and Apache are not contradictory. Taken together,
however, the holdings result in a treatment of oil and gas producers that does
not conform to the symmetric treatment of these industries by Oklahoma's
statutory law. If the intent of the legislature as expressed by the structure
of the Code is to be preserved, at least one of the holdings must be changed.
123. Id. § 39-6-302(a).
124. Id. § 39-2-202. The arm's length criteria used in Wyoming is broad enough to include
the arm's length plus additional tax burden used by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 509 P.2d at 116.
125. In re Monolith Portland Midwest Co., 574 P.2d 757 (Wyo. 1978); J. Ray McDermott
v. Hudson, 370 P.2d 364 (Wyo. 1962).
126. N.D. CENT. CoDE §§ 57-51-01 to 57-51-03 (Supp. 1987). There is also an oil extraction
tax on the gross value of oil. Id. § 51.1-01 to 51.1-08.
127. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Conrad, 410 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1987).
128. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. State, 274 N.W.2d 580, 582 (N.D. 1979).
129. Private Communication, Chief Auditor, Oil and Gas Section, N.D. Tax Dep't. (Sept.
6, 1989). It should be noted that the North Dakota courts have rejected the portion of Apache
that held the gross value of gas is determined at the time of contract not the time of production.
410 N.W.2d at 128-29. As discussed above, the view of the North Dakota court on this matter
is still consistent with allowing the market to determine the gross value of the product. See supra
text accompanying note 88.
130. New Mexico's ad valorem production tax levies a tax on the actual price received and
expressly allows deductions for transportation. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-32-2(D) through 5(3) (Supp.
1986). Kansas taxes oil and gas through a real property tax that expressly instructs the assessor
to take the need for transportation into account. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-331 (Supp. 1987). Kan-
sas also has a severance tax on the gross value of oil and gas. Id. 79-4217, 79-4230.
131. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-32-6 (Supp. 1986).
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The holding in Atlantic is at odds with other provisions of the Code and
distributes the tax burden rigidly and unfairly. These points, raised by the
dissent in Atlantic, are supported by the decision in Apache.
The Apache holding is more equitable, provides flexibility for changing ways
of doing business and conforms more closely to the intent of the legislature.
Therefore, the holding of Apache should be applied uniformly to producers
of both gas and oil, and transportation deductions should be allowed in com-
puting the gross production tax on oil.
Lawrence Fleishman
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